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Abstract 
 
In this paper, we investigated the impact of different institutions on ethnic minorities’ political 
participation. Based on the results of a hierarchical cross-country comparison, we found that 
individuals belonging to ethnic minorities were less likely to participate in national elections 
than members of the majority groups within the same country. We tested whether this 
negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group on political participation could be 
attenuated by inclusive institutions such as suffrage rights, horizontal power-sharing 
institutions (Proportional electoral system PR, effective proportionality, the number of 
government parties) or vertical power-dividing institutions in terms of federalism (subnational 
elections and subnational authority) attenuated the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic 
minority group. The results of multilevel analyses showed that suffrage rights attenuate the 
negative effect of minority status on political participation. In contrast, power dividing 
enhances the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group on political 
participation.  
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Introduction 
Political participation and political equality are two of the most basic democratic ideals (Dahl, 
1998, 2006). Theoretically, they are perfectly compatible. In practice, however, political 
participation is highly unequal. Unequal participation can lead to unequal influence, which 
questions the principle of representative democracies in which democratic responsiveness is 
based on citizen participation. Moreover, unequal participation is not randomly distributed, 
but systematically biased (Dahl, 2006; Lijphart, 1997). This means that not all interests are 
equally represented and, therefore, that the maxim of responsiveness and political equality is 
violated (Rueschemeyer, 2004; Teorell, 2007). Moreover, “who votes and who doesn't has 
important consequences for who gets elected and for the content of public policies” (Lijphart, 
1997, p. 4). This implies that the abstention of specific groups of individuals leads to the 
systematic exclusion of interests, which can reduce political support and endanger political 
stability (Easton, 1965). 
 
In this paper, we analyze the political participation of ethnic minorities. Based on the results 
of participatory research, ethnicity is an important factor in political abstention (Norris, 2004; 
Sandovici & Listhaug, 2010). In light of ongoing migration, we argue that this can pose a 
serious problem for contemporary democracies because poor social, economic, and political 
integration of minorities might endanger social harmony and provoke civic unrest. 
Furthermore, the failure to represent minorities’ voices and the systematic exclusion of their 
interests might lead to decreased democratic legitimacy and political instability (Cain, 1992, 
p. 273). The permanent underrepresentation of ethnic minorities might also contribute to their 
alienation from the political system. Consequently, minorities might display less respect for 
the laws that are enacted without their legitimate input by legislative bodies which they view 
as illegitimate. Moreover, if a sizeable minority group is not able to secure its political 
representation, the pressure for secession and the establishment of an independent nation 
might increase (Zimmermann, 1994, p. 3).  
Given these challenges to contemporary democracies, knowing why ethnic minorities 
participate in the political system and, more importantly, what can be done to increase their 
participation, is of great importance. We argue that ethnic minorities can only secure political 
equality and political representation if they decide to participate in the political process. Of 
course, as Sandovici and Listaugh (2010) stated, there are many different forms of political 
participation. Certainly, the use of all channels is important for the democratic process, 
because it helps to raise new issues. Nevertheless, we contend that voting is the only form of 
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participation that actually allows for political representation. According to the responsive 
model of representative democracy, electoral participation is the most important mean for 
citizens to inform governing officials of their preferences and needs (Teorell, 2006). 
Therefore, we focused on the determinants of ethnic minority participation at national 
elections.  
 
Researchers have reported that minorities have a lower probability of participating in politics 
simply because they are minorities. When minority status means that an individual’s 
preferences are neither heard nor included in the political system, (conventional) political 
participation is not rational in a Downsian sense (1957). One of the most important features of 
democracies then should be that minorities can become majorities. In well-functioning 
democracies, political losers must become winners from time to time and vice versa 
(Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005). However, this idea of changing 
majorities becomes problematic when the status of political loser is congruent with invariable 
social characteristics. We argue that this situation is most probable for ethnic minorities 
because the chance that their culturally specific preferences are heard and included in the 
political system is low. Even more problematic, ethnic boundaries often correspond to other 
salient political cleavages (Htun 2004), which makes it unlikely that minority preferences are 
represented by established parties. 
 
As Lijphart (1977, 1999) points out, the inclusion of ethnic minorities can be facilitated by 
institutional settings. In our paper, we tested several institutions that are assumed to be 
remedies with regard to their ability to promote the political inclusion of ethnic minorities. 
We contend that countries with open electoral systems and power-sharing institutions are 
more successful in including ethnic minorities. Effective inclusion takes place at every step of 
the electoral process, from suffrage rights to election rules and the degree of representation 
(Holden, 2006). In addition, the sharing of political power between different groups and 
various governmental levels is suggested to foster inclusion (Lijphart, 1999; Vatter, 2009).  
 
Our investigation of the inclusiveness of several institutions is based on the European Social 
Survey (ESS4; 2008). The sample was comprised of more than 4,000 individuals from 25 
countries who were asked whether they belonged to a minority ethnic group and whether they 
voted in previous national elections. We conducted multilevel analyses and tested whether (1) 
belonging to an ethnic minority group affected an individual’s electoral participation, (2) the 
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strength of this effect varied between countries, and (3) these country differences could be 
explained by institutions that allowed for better inclusion, including those that motivated 
ethnic minorities to participate in elections. Specifically, we tested whether the assumed 
institutions extenuated the negative impact of belonging to a minority group on electoral 
participation.  
 
This paper is composed of four sections. In section 1, we elaborate upon the idea that ethnic 
minorities exhibit lower electoral participation and consider the possible institutional 
mechanisms that might attenuate the negative effect. Section 2 describes the research 
methodology.  In section 3, we present the results of the empirical tests. Finally, section 4 
contains our conclusions.   
 
Theoretical and Empirical Insights 
Electoral Participation of Ethnic Minorities 
The first question examined in this section is whether ethnic minorities participate less in 
elections than their compatriots. Results of participatory research have shown that ethnicity is 
an important determinant of political abstention (Norris, 2004; Sandovici & Listhaug, 2010). 
It is generally assumed that ethnic minorities do not sufficiently participate in politics due to 
biases in the political opportunity structures of the host countries (Fennema & Tillie, 2001). 
However, this argument focuses specifically on ethnic minorities without voting rights. It 
does not address the question of why ethnic minorities participate less than their compatriots, 
even though they have the right to vote.1  
 
According to rational choice theorists, the decision to vote is based on a simple calculation: 
people vote if the benefits of voting outweigh the costs (Blais, 2000; Downs, 1957). Thus, a 
rational individual must decide whether his or her vote is likely to influence the election 
outcome. If the preferred candidate is sure to win, voting is irrational. If an individual’s 
personal favorite is sure to lose, the same logic holds true. In sum, if the result is already clear 
before the elections, the expected benefit of voting will be nil. According to rational choice 
theories, rational voters should not vote in this situation (Blais, 2000). While rational choice 
theorists regard voting always as irrational (Blais, 2000), the approach might, nevertheless, 
prove useful for the present analysis. If voting is already assumed to be irrational for the 
                                                 
1
 It is important to note that we analyzed only ethnic minorities who had the right to vote in our models. Re-
spondents who reported that they belonged to an ethnic minority group but did not have the right to vote in the 
country in which they lived were excluded from the sample.  
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average voter, it should be even more unreasonable for ethnic minorities. Although a single 
vote will probably never make a difference in an election (Blais, 2000), voters who are 
members of the majority group can at least reasonably expect that their preferred candidate 
might win. In contrast, the chance for representatives of minority groups to get elected is 
usually much smaller. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that ethnic minorities are 
generally less willing to vote than their compatriots. 
 
Whereas most empirical findings indicate that ethnic minorities are less likely to go to the 
polls, Sandovici and Listaugh (2010) argued that ethnicity could have either a positive or a 
negative impact on an individual’s level of political involvement. On the one hand, a minority 
status can lead to low participation rates, such as in the case of a group2 that is marginalized. 
On the other hand, ethnicity can work as a catalyst for participation because group identity 
and group solidarity might be strong motivational factors (Sandovici & Listaugh, 2010). 
However, at least in respect to voting, Sandovici and Listaugh (2010) found that ethnic 
minorities were less likely to participate at national elections than majorities.  
 
A first look at our data seems to confirm these results. Table 1 shows the percentage of people 
belonging to an ethnic minority group who participated in the election in comparison to their 
compatriots. Our analyses is based on 40'000 respondents in 25 countries from the European 
Social Survey Wave 43 (ESS4; 2008).To measure electoral participation, we used the question 
from the ESS4 on voting4 and recoded the responses binomially with a value of (1) indicating 
that a person took part in the last elections. For our main independent variable, ethnic 
minority membership, we used the question from the ESS4 on ethnicity,5 where 1 refers to the 
fact that an individual self-reported that he or she belonged to an ethnic minority group. With 
this operationalization we are certain to only count individuals as ethnic minorities who 
actually stated that they did not belong to a country’s majority population. Accordingly, we 
account for the common definition of ethnic identities as social constructions and measure the 
affective sense of belonging. We argue that ethnic identities are primarily dependent upon 
one’s own feelings, rather than upon specific, measurable attributes (see Norris 2004). 
                                                 
2
 Of course, we could not differentiate between various ethnic groups within a specific country because, in con-
trast to most previous studies, we used a comparative approach. Our aim is to show and explain differences 
among countries, rather than within them.  
3
 Latvia was excluded due to the absence of minorities in the sample. Russia and the Ukraine were excluded 
from our sample because we included only democracies. The 25 countries in our sample are listed in Table 1.  
4
 B11: Some people don’t vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the last [country] national 
election in [month/year]? 
5
 C32: Do you belong to a minority ethnic group in [country]? 
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Consistent with the results of previous empirical studies, Table 1 shows lower levels of 
electoral participation among ethnic minorities in most countries compared with members of 
the majority group. There are only four countries (i.e., Bulgaria, Poland, Slovakia, and 
Slovenia) in which people belonging to an ethnic minority group are more likely to vote than 
their compatriots. It is particularly striking that all four countries are located in Eastern 
Europe and achieved democracy relatively recently in the early 1990s.  
 
A closer look at these countries might contribute to a better understanding of this deviant 
pattern. In the case of Bulgaria, an ethnic cleansing against Turks took place in the late 1980s 
involving approximately 350,000 people. Another 350,000 Turks were forced to assimilate. 
Therefore, by the time the democratic transition began, they were truly integrated into the 
political life of Bulgaria. Thus, although Turks in Bulgaria might still characterize themselves 
as “minorities,” there are no relevant ethnic tensions left. This might explain why they do not 
participate less in elections than their compatriots (Raichev & Todorov, 2006). More 
importantly, the Turkish minority in Bulgaria is organized in its own party with 
representatives in Parliament (Ganev, 2004). Slovakia is similar to Bulgaria: the largest 
minority group is also organized in its own party and proportionally represented in Parliament 
(Essex Election Archive, 2010). Thus, ethnic minorities in these two countries might have 
decided to participate in the elections because they saw a chance to influence political 
decisions. In contrast, Slovenia and Poland are relatively homogenous countries with a high 
concentration of Catholics (Miheljak, 2006). Hence, the combination of a homogenous 
society and homogenous religious affiliations probably worked as an integrative mechanism.  
 
Table 1: Participation of Ethnic Minorities and Majorities by Country 
Country Minority Majority Country Minority Majority 
Belgium 80 92.51 Netherlands 58.06 75.25 
Bulgaria 82.79 69.82 Norway 62.5 86.32 
Croatia 72 79.27 Poland 91.67 73.03 
Cyprus 59.26 94.28 Portugal 60 73.28 
Czech Republic 32.56 58.46 Romania 67.9 67.3 
Denmark 81.08 94.55 Slovakia 74.07 72.5 
Estonia 40.72 70.12 Slovenia 80.41 77.31 
Finland 54.17 83.6 Spain 67.5 81.67 
France 55.74 78.43 Sweden 86.05 91.43 
Germany 65.33 83.22 Switzerland 48.57 64.18 
Greece 82.09 87.08 Turkey 72.66 81.04 
Hungary 80.77 80.12 United Kingdom 62.24 71.41 
Israel 68.82 77.82 Overall  67.97 78.28 
Note. Share of individuals who stated that they participated in the last national election (%). 
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A closer look at Table 1 reveals that the gap between ethnic minorities and majorities differs 
considerably between countries. In some countries, the gap between the voter turnout of the 
majority and the minority population is only small, while it is rather large in others. Of course, 
Table 1 only shows the proportion of individuals. To test whether ethnic minority group 
membership leads to a lower propensity to participate in the electoral process, we have to rely 
on individual-level data. Consequently, our first hypothesis is:  
 
H1) An individual who describes him- or herself as belonging to an ethnic 
minority group has a lower probability of participating in elections than an 
individual who does not belong to an ethnic minority group. 
 
Admittedly, minority status is not the only important determinant of non-voting behavior. The 
literature provides several additional individual characteristics that explain electoral 
participation. There are five categories of explanatory factors for political participation 
(Bühlmann, 2006; Knight & Marsh, 2002). (1) Predispositions and resources, such as gender,6 
age,7 and education,8 are seen as basic determinants of electoral participation. Older and 
educated men are expected to show a higher propensity to participate in national elections 
than younger women with low education levels. (2) Political skills also influence electoral 
participation. Individuals who are interested in politics,9 are ready to inform themselves about 
political matters10, and have the necessary skills to participate in elections11 are expected to 
participate more often in politics. (3) Political attitudes and the manifestation of ideological 
values are seen as additional determinants of electoral participation. Specifically, individuals 
who feel close to a party12 or are members of a party13 should possess more motivation to go 
to the polls. (4) Social capital is another determinant of political participation (Franzen & 
Freitag, 2007). Voluntary work and social trust are viewed as important components of this 
concept. The majority of empirical studies examining social capital in an attempt to explain 
                                                 
6
 F21: Sex was recoded as (1)=male and (0)=female. 
7
 F31b: Age of respondent was calculated. We included only respondents who were at least 18 years of age and 
less than 99 years of age. 
8
 F6: What is the highest level of education you have completed? Responses ranged from (0)=not completed 
primary education to (6)=second stage of tertiary. 
9
 B1: How interested would you say you are in politics? Responses ranged from (0)= not at all to (3)=very inter-
ested. 
10
 A5: On an average weekday, how much time, in total, do you spend reading newspapers? Responses ranged 
from (0)= no time to (7)= more than 3 hours. 
11
 B2: How often does politics seem so complicated that you can’t really understand what is going on? Respons-
es ranged from (1)= frequently to (5)= never. 
12
 B20a: Is there a party you feel closer to than all the other parties? Responses were (0)= no and (1)= yes. 
13
 B21: Are you a member of any political party? Responses were (0)= no and (1)= yes. 
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electoral participation have found a positive effect of voluntary work for political 
organization14 and social trust15 on an individual’s propensity to vote. (5) Variables measuring 
political support are also important factors for political participation. Individuals with high 
specific support,16 which is typically measured by the degree of confidence in different 
political actors and/or institutions, and high diffuse support,17 which is frequently measured 
by the degree of confidence in or satisfaction with the entire society and/or system, are more 
motivated to take part in national elections. To test our first hypothesis, we controlled for the 
effects of these five categories.  
 
Institutional Remedies for a Better Inclusion of Minorities 
Based on the findings in Table 1, we wonder whether the gaps between minority and majority 
electoral participation can be explained by the countries’ different institutional settings. The 
question is, whether there are institutions which promote ethnic minorities’ propensity of 
voting (i.e., make the electoral participation of ethnic minorities seem more rational).  
 
Indeed, participation becomes more rational when the probability increases that an 
individual’s vote makes a difference (Downs, 1957). One might argue that it is not rational for 
a member of an ethnic minority group to participate in elections when the probability to have 
an influence is low. However, in the literature, several institutional opportunities are discussed 
which can enhance the probability of (ethnic) minorities being heard. The most prominent 
theory, which highlights formal possibilities to include minorities, is Lijphart’s (1977, 1999) 
idea of consociationalism. The consensus model of democracy aims at sharing, dispersing, 
and limiting power. Contrary to the majoritarian democracies, consensus democracies are apt 
to include minorities. In heterogeneous societies, the probability that “today’s minority can 
become the majority in the next election” is low (Lijphart, 1999, p. 31). Thus, majoritarian 
rules are less appropriate in countries with different minority groups because they lower the 
chance for minorities to become the majority. Consequently, consensual forms of democracy 
are of major importance for ethnic minorities.  
 
Lijphart (1977, 1984, 1999) highlights different institutional features that characterize 
                                                 
14
 B14: Have you worked in a political party or action group? Responses were (0)= no and (1)= yes. 
15
 A8: Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in 
dealing with people? Responses ranged from (0)= you can’t be to careful to (10)= most people can be trusted. 
16
 B4: Please tell me how much you personally trust each of the institutions I read out [Parliament]. Responses 
ranged from (0)= no trust at all to (10)= complete trust. 
17
 B27: And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]? Responses ranged 
from (0)=extremely dissatisfied to (10)= extremely satisfied. 
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consensual democracies and facilitate the inclusion of minorities’ preferences. He 
distinguished horizontal (electoral system, coalitions) and vertical power sharing institutions 
(federalism). In this article, we added an additional basic institution by assuming that 
widespread suffrage rights are of crucial importance for the inclusion of ethnic minorities. 
 
The most basic prerequisite for being heard is having a voice. There is no serious democratic 
theory that is not based on inclusiveness (Dahl, 1971). However, reality falls short of 
guaranteeing everyone the right to vote (Paxton, Bollen, Lee, & Kim, 2003). Hence, there is 
no country with universal suffrage.18 According to Munck and Verkuilen (2002), “[a]lthough 
de jure restrictions on the right to vote are not found in current democracies, a wide battery of 
other restrictions, usually informal ones, curb the effective use of the formal right to vote and 
significantly distort the values of vote” (p. 11). Due to electoral as well as naturalization laws, 
there is a discrepancy between the electorate and citizenship in all established democracies. 
However, when citizenship is a precondition for voting rights, ethnic minorities are punished 
because the hurdles for electoral participation are either insurmountable or at least narrow. 
We argue that ethnic minorities, even if they do have suffrage rights (as is the case in the 
following analyses), are less motivated to go to the polls because their chance of being heard 
is low when their compatriots have no voting rights. Further, restrictive suffrage rights can be 
seen as a sign of a culture of low inclusiveness (Paxton et al., 2003). 
 
As for the horizontal power sharing, it is argued that the electoral mechanism that best 
matches the idea of power sharing is based on proportional representation (PR) systems.19 PR 
reduces the barriers for smaller parties that are representing the interests of minorities 
(Lijphart, 1977, 1999; Norris, 2008), as each party receives a number of seats in proportion of 
its votes. However, due to different formal attributes of electoral systems, such as district 
magnitude and legal thresholds), this proportionality varies among countries (Lijphart, 1991, 
1999). Therefore, in addition to the formal electoral system, the effective proportionality20 
should be taken into account.  
 
Due to the higher number of (minority) parties, PR has an additional feature that strengthens 
                                                 
18
 Extent of universal suffrage: Starting from 100%, 0.25 to 1 percentage points were subtracted for each re-
striction for universal suffrage that applied. In total, 23 types of restrictions were accounted for. Source: Paxton 
et al. (2003). 
19
 PR: proportional representation (0)= no; (1)= yes. Source: Database of Political Institutions (2009). 
20
 Disproportionality of electoral system: Gallagher-Index; own calculations based on Mitchell/Gallagher (2008). 
Higher values indicate a more proportional system. 
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power sharing: it fosters the probability of large government coalitions,21 or “executive 
power-sharing in broad coalition cabinets” (Lijphart, 1999, p. 34). Even if there are several 
parties in Parliament, the most important indicator of effective political inclusion is the 
number of effective parties in the government. It is argued that consensual and inclusive 
power sharing works best within a large executive (Anderson, 1998). 
Of course, some doubt the potential of PR for minority inclusion. First, PR allows the 
inclusion of not only ethnic minorities, but also small parties from the radical right that might 
try to exclude ethnic minorities or veto consensual decisions (Norris, 2008). Second, as 
Rothschild (2002) contended, PR can hinder cross-group cooperation. One could even argue 
that this might lead to decreased engagement of ethnic minorities in national politics and, 
therefore, to lower participation scores in national elections. Third, as Stojanovic (2006) 
shows on the example of Switzerland, PR does not necessarily have an inclusive impact. 
Specifically, in a context, where groups are territorially concentrated, electoral districts mirror 
the territorial concentration of these groups and the districts are represented in parliament 
according to their population-share, majority rule might work as well as PR-rule.  
 
Lijphart (1977, 1999, 2004) described vertical power dividing institutions in terms of 
federalism as the second dimension of consensual democracies. There are two main 
arguments why the decentralization of power is expected to have an inclusive impact. First, 
the transfer of decision-making abilities to elected subnational bodies broadens the 
opportunities for citizen participation. Second, federalism allows spatially concentrated 
minority groups to manage their own affairs and to protect their cultural interests within their 
own communities (Norris, 2008). These opportunities should foster political interest and 
engagement and, consequently, increase an individual’s propensity to vote. Drawing upon 
Gerring and Thacker (2005), we highlight two features of federalism. First, we argue that 
there must be the possibility for subnational elections.22 Local electoral competition can 
increase the incentives of public officials to be responsive to the preferences of local 
inhabitants (Qian & Weingast, 1997), including the preferences of minorities. Greater 
responsiveness should then lead to an increase of participation willingness. Second, to be 
effectively autonomous, federal units must have authority over taxing, spending, and 
legislating,23 given that it is only rational to participate when there is something upon which 
                                                 
21
 Number of government parties: own calculations based on multiple election statistics. 
22
 Auton: Are there autonomous regions? Responses were (0)= no and (1)= yes. Source: Database of Political 
Institutions (2009). 
23
 Author: Do the state/provinces have authority over taxing, spending, or legislating? Responses were (0)= no 
and (1)= yes. Source: Database of Political Institutions (2009). 
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to decide. 
However, there are skeptics who question the inclusive impact of federalism. Overlapping 
functions may reduce the clarity of responsibility and, therefore, electoral accountability 
(Powell & Whitten, 1993). Furthermore, territorial autonomy can reinforce ethnic differences 
and even lead to separation. Finally, one might argue that the incentives of federalism only 
work at the subnational level. Thus, one might assume that minority participation in national 
elections should not be influenced by the degree of federalism. In addition, it is possible that 
vertical power dividing fosters individual participation at the subnational, but not at the 
national level. Therefore, some would expect a negative impact of vertical power sharing on 
participation in national elections. However, this idea challenges Lijphart’s (1999) initial idea 
regarding the inclusive impact of decentralization. 
 
We do not assume that the aforementioned institutions foster electoral participation in a direct 
way. In fact, we suggest that suffrage rights as well as horizontal and vertical power-sharing 
institutions have an interactive impact. That is, they attenuate the (assumed) negative effect of 
belonging to an ethnic minority group on the propensity to vote. Consequently, our second 
hypothesis is: 
 
H2) The more widespread the suffrage rights in a country are, the better PR 
system work, the more government parties there are, whereas the more 
decentralized a country is, the weaker the negative impact of belonging to an 
ethnic minority group on electoral participation.  
 
We control for additional important contextual determinants, which could affect electoral 
participation. However, given the low number of countries, macro controls should not be too 
numerous. We, therefore, decided to include compulsory voting24 and unemployment.25 Both 
variables were frequently found to be important factors for electoral turnout (see Blais 2006).  
Beyond the voting system (Carter & Farrell, 2010), compulsory voting is seen as the most 
important institutional variable that explains turnout (Blais, 2006; Blais et al., 2003; Norris, 
2002). The argument that going to the polls is more probable when voting is compulsory 
comes close to a tautology. However, the rules of compulsory voting can be more or less 
authoritative and the question remains whether the duty to vote also influences ethnic 
minorities.  
                                                 
24
 Compulsory Voting: (0)= no; (1)= yes. Source: IDEA (2010). 
25
 Unemployment, total (% of total labor force). Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank (2010). 
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Since the beginning of systematic cross-country investigation on electoral turnout, the 
economic situation has been part of the explanatory set (Jackman, 1987; Powell, 1986). 
Although the impact of wealth on turnout is not clear (Blais, 2006), there seems to be 
agreement that economic downturns increase turnout (Radcliff, 1992). As a result, we decided 
to include the unemployment rate as a control variable. Furthermore, in most countries it is 
the minorities that suffers most on unemployment.   
 
Research Design and Method 
To test our assumptions about the interactive impact of institutions on ethnic minorities’ 
electoral participation, we proceed in two steps.  First, we test whether belonging to an ethnic 
minority group has a negative impact on an individual’s propensity to vote in national 
elections. We also examine whether this effect varies among different countries in our sample. 
If there is no variation, it made no sense to suggest a differing cross-level impact of 
institutions.   
 
Additionally, we control for the most important individual and contextual determinants of 
electoral participation as discussed above. In the second step, we test the second hypothesis 
by modeling the interactive effect of the institutional determinants. Specifically, we 
investigate whether widespread suffrage, PR, effective proportional representation, a high 
number of government parties, subnational authority, and subnational elections attenuate the 
negative effect of belonging to a minority group on electoral participation. Thus, we are not 
interested in the direct effect of institutions on diffuse support. We do not assume that these 
institutions foster electoral participation, but that they have a moderating impact on effects of 
individual characteristics (i.e., belonging to an ethnic minority group) on individual behavior 
and attitudes (i.e., propensity to participate in national elections). 
 
To test our hypotheses, we use multilevel analyses that allow us to model a varying effect of 
belonging to an ethnic minority group on electoral participation (step 1) and to explain this 
variance by the interactive impact of the different inclusive institutions discussed above (step 
2). The underlying principle of multilevel modeling is that intercepts of common linear 
ordinary least square (OLS)-regression analysis are allowed to vary around an overall mean:  
 
(1) ijjijij Xy εββ ++= 110 , where  
(2) jj 000 µββ +=  ( j0µ stands for the residuals at the contextual level). 
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Moreover, multilevel models permit the modeling of cross-level interactions, which allow us 
to measure the influence of contextual factors on the strength of the relationship between 
response and predictor variables at the lower level—methodologically speaking, the steepness 
of the slope.   
 
Our dependent variable is dichotomous. Therefore, we do not use OLS-regression for our 
estimation, but transformed the dependent variable into a logit structure.  Estimation and 
interpretation for logit-multilevel analysis are similar to conventional logit analysis (see Long, 
1997). Schematically, the models upon which our analyses are based will have the following 
form: 
 
(3) jkijkjijkijkjnjnjnijnijij XXWWWXXit 0111221)(log µµεγααβββpi ++++++++++= KK  
 
The propensity to participate in national elections (y) of an individual i within a country j is 
explained by an overall mean of electoral participation ( 1β ), individual characteristics (X, and 
their estimates, β , contextual factors (W, and their estimates, α ,), cross-level interaction 
terms of the minority status (Xk), and the respective institutional variables (Wk) ( kijkj XW , their 
estimates, γ ,) in which the effect of the estimate is randomized ( kjβ ), contextual variation 
( j0µ with an assumed mean of 0 and a total between-context variance of 2µσ ), individual 
variation ( ijε with an assumed mean of 0 and a total within-context variance of 2σ ), and slope 
variation ( kijkj Xµ ).  The overall variation ( 2µσ + 2σ ) is divided into differences at the 
individual level (level-1 variance), which is explained by individual characteristics, and 
differences between contexts (level-2 variance), which are explained by contextual factors. 
The slope variance is explained by the interaction terms. We defer to a more thorough 
discussion of the method and refer to the relevant literature on multilevel analysis (Hox, 2010; 
Jones, 1997; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Teachman & Crowder, 2002). 
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Empirical Results 
As mentioned above, we proceeded stepwise. Table 2 shows the results of the first step. The 
four models examine the impact of belonging to an ethnic minority group on participation in 
national elections. The results of the empty model demonstrate that individual electoral 
participation varies significantly among the 25 countries in our sample. Whereas most of the 
variance in participation propensity is due to individual characteristics (91%), approximately 
9% of the overall variance is explained by contextual factors.26 The remaining three models 
seem to confirm our first hypothesis: An individual who describes him- or herself as 
belonging to an ethnic minority group has a lower probability of participating in elections 
than an individual who belongs to the majority group. This effect varies significantly among 
countries as indicated by the significant slope variance in model 2 and remains strong when 
we control for important individual as well as contextual factors (see model 3).  
Table 2 : Minority Electoral Participation   
 Empty Model  Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
FIXED EFFECTS     
Constant  1.36 (.11)**  1.38 (.11)**  1.38 (.11)** -1.62 (.21)*** 
Individual Level     
Ethnic Minority - -0.43 (.05)** -0.53 (.12)** -0.51 (.15)*** 
Age - - -  1.88 (.07)*** 
Gender - - - -0.15 (.03)*** 
Education - - -  0.93 (.07)*** 
Interest - - -  1.05 (.05)*** 
Awareness (newspapers) - - -  0.39 (.08)*** 
Efficacy - - -  0.15 (.05)*** 
Party attachment - - -  1.00 (.03)*** 
Party membership - - -  0.81 (.11)*** 
Social trust - - -  0.26 (.06)*** 
Voluntary work for pol. org - - -  0.47 (.05)*** 
Confidence Parliament - - -  0.71 (.06)*** 
Satisfaction with democracy - - -  0.33 (.07)*** 
Country Level     
Compulsory Voting - - - 1.02 (.31)*** 
Unemployment - - - 0.81 (.40)** 
RANDOM EFFECTS     
Individual level (
2σ
) 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 
Contextual level (
2
0µσ ) 0.31 (.09)** 0.31 (.09)*** 0.32 (.09)*** 0.24 (.07)*** 
Slope variance - - 0.30 (.11)** 0.45 (.16)** 
Covariance - - -0.12 (.07) -0.05 (.08) 
MODEL PROPERTIES     
Number of cases (countries) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 
Wald (Joint Chi2) (df) 146.1 (1) 219.3 (2) 149.1 (2) 4845.5 (16) 
Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets. All independent variables were rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value of the variable. Coefficients indicate the change 
associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. The Wald test is an approximate Chi2-based test of the 
model fit. All models calculated with the runmlwin-command in Stata 11, first-order MQL binominal restricted 
maximum likelihood estimations; * significant at the 90% level ; ** siginfiant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 
99% level.  
                                                 
26
 In a logit-model, the share of variance of the individual level is equal to 3.29 (Snjiders & Bosker, 1999, p. 
224). Therefore, the overall variance (3.29+.31=3.60) can be attributed to 9% to the context (.31/3.60) and to 
91% to the individual characteristics (3.29/3.60). 
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As for these controls, the results mostly support our assumptions. Age, education, political 
skills – such as interest, awareness, and efficacy – social capital (in terms of social trust and 
membership), political capital (in terms of party attachment and party membership), and 
political support – as confidence in parliament and satisfaction with democracy – all had the 
expected positive and significant effect on an individual’s electoral participation. The same 
holds true for the contextual determinants. As expected, compulsory voting and 
unemployment foster voter turnout. Individuals who live in a country with compulsory 
participation and high unemployment rates have a higher probability to go to the polls than 
individuals who live in countries with high employment rates but without an institutionalized 
duty to vote.27  
The only counterintuitive effect is observed with regard to the gender variable. It seems that 
the traditional gender gap has not only diminished, but indeed reversed (also see Conway, 
Steuernagel, & Ahern, 2005). In other words, women have a higher propensity to participate 
in national elections than men in our sample of 25 democracies. However, for our purposes, 
the most important result is the stable and negative impact of belonging to an ethnic minority 
group on electoral participation.  
 
In the next step, we analyzed whether the negative effect of belonging to an ethnic minority 
group on electoral participation is attenuated by the six institutions discussed above. Table 3 
summarizes the findings. For each institution, we ran a model with the same individual and 
contextual controls as in Table 2. Table 3 shows that all control variables maintain their 
explanatory power. At the country level, only one of our six institutions had a direct impact 
on electoral participation. Federalism, at least in terms of authority of subnational states over 
taxing, spending, and legislating, had a negative impact on an individual’s electoral 
participation. Disproportionality, a proportional system, suffrage rights, the number of 
government parties, and the possibility for subnational elections did not have a significant 
direct effect on an individual’s propensity to go to the polls.  
                                                 
27
 We tested for additional macro controls discussed in the literature. However, the age of the democracy, popu-
lation size, gross domestic product per capita, and share of farmers did not show a significant relationship with 
electoral participation. Given the low number of countries, we decided to include only the significant contextual 
variables in the models.  
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Table 3 : Institutional Remedies for Low Ethnic Minority Participation 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
FIXED EFFECTS       
Constant  -1.58 (.52)*** -1.98 (.31)*** -2.25 (.44)*** -1.47 (.27)*** -1.56 (.20)*** -1.53 (.28)*** 
Individual Level       
Ethnic Minority -1.89 (.63)*** -0.80 (.37)** -0.28 (.48) -0.45 (.25)* -0.38 (.18)** -0.54 (.27)* 
Age 1.88 (.07)*** 1.89 (.07)*** 1.89 (.07)*** 1.89 (.07)*** 1.89 (.07)*** 1.89 (.07)*** 
Gender -0.15 (.03)*** -0.15 (.03)*** -0.15 (.03)*** -0.15 (.03)*** -0.15 (.03)*** -0.15 (.03)*** 
Education 0.94 (.07)*** 0.94 (.07)*** 0.94 (.07)*** 0.94 (.07)*** 0.94 (.07)*** 0.94 (.07)*** 
Interest 1.05 (.05)*** 1.06 (.05)*** 1.06 (.05)*** 1.06 (.05)*** 1.06 (.05)*** 1.06 (.05)*** 
Awareness (newspapers) 0.39 (.08)*** 0.39 (.08)*** 0.39 (.08)*** 0.39 (.08)*** 0.39 (.08)*** 0.39 (.08)*** 
Efficacy 0.15 (.05)*** 0.15 (.05)*** 0.15 (.05)*** 0.15 (.05)*** 0.15 (.05)*** 0.15 (.05)*** 
Party attachment 1.00 (.03)*** 1.01 (.03)** 1.01 (.03)** 1.01 (.03)** 1.01 (.03)** 1.01 (.03)** 
Party membership 0.81 (.11)*** 0.81 (.11)*** 0.81 (.11)*** 0.81 (.11)*** 0.81 (.11)*** 0.81 (.11)*** 
Social trust 0.26 (.06)*** 0.26 (.06)*** 0.26 (.06)*** 0.26 (.06)*** 0.26 (.06)*** 0.26 (.06)*** 
Voluntary Work f. pol. 
org 0.47 (.05)*** 0.47 (.05)*** 0.47 (.05)*** 0.47 (.05)*** 0.47 (.05)*** 0.47 (.05)*** 
Confidence Parliament 0.72 (.06)*** 0.72 (.06)*** 0.72 (.06)*** 0.71 (.07)*** 0.71 (.07)*** 0.71 (.07)*** 
Satisfaction with dem 0.33 (.07)*** 0.33 (.07)*** 0.33 (.07)*** 0.33 (.07)*** 0.33 (.07)*** 0.33 (.07)*** 
Country Level       
Compulsory voting 1.06 (.38)*** 0.87 (.30)*** 1.08 (.30)*** 0.98 (.31)*** 0.94 (.29)*** 0.97 (.32)*** 
Unemployment 0.77 (.43)* 0.85 (.39)** 1.04 (.42)** 0.74 (.41)* 0.92 (.37)** 0.80 (.41)** 
Suffrage rights -0.04 (.68) - - - - - 
PR system - 0.42 (.27) - - - - 
Disproportionality of 
electoral system - - 0.72 (.44) - - - 
Number of government 
parties - - - -0.26 (.35) - - 
Subnational authority - - - - -0.39 (.21)* - 
Subnational elections - - - - - -0.11 (.23) 
Interaction Terms       
Suffrage rights * 
Minority 1.88 (.83)** - - - - - 
PR system * Minority - 0.36 (.41) - - - - 
Disproportionality  * 
Minority - - -0.33 (.64) - - - 
Number of government 
parties * Minority - - - -0.23 (.52) - - 
Subnational authority * 
Minority - - - - -0.48 (.34) - 
Subnational elections * 
Minority - - - - - 0.04 (.33) 
RANDOM EFFECTS       
Individual level (
2σ
) 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 1 (0)** 
Contextual level (
2
0µσ ) 0.25 (.07)** 0.24 (.07)** 0.23 (.07)** 0.25 (.07)** 0.22 (.06)** 0.25 (.07)** 
Slope Variance 0.39 (.14)** 0.47 (.17)** 0.49 (.17)** 0.48 (.17)** 0.45 (.16)** 0.47 (.17)** 
Covariance -0.05 (.07) -0.08 (.08) -0.04 (.08) -0.07 (.08) -0.09 (.07) -0.05 (.08) 
MODEL PROPERTIES 
      
Number of cases 
(countries) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 40853 (25) 
Wald (Joint Chi2) 4878.7 (18) 3615.0 (18) 4058.0 (18) 8397.1 (18) 8621.9 (18) 5284.9 (18) 
Note: Not standardized coefficients with standard errors in brackets. All independent variables were rescaled on a scale 
of 0-1 where 0 indicates the lowest value and 1 the highest value of the variable. Coefficients indicate the change 
associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. The Wald test is an approximate Chi2-based test of the 
model fit. All models calculated runmlwin-command in Stata 11, first-order MQL binominal restricted maximum 
likelihood estimations; * significant at the 90% level ; ** siginfiant at the 95% level; *** significant at the 99% level  
 
Of course, we are interested in the indirect effect of these institutions (i.e., interactive impact) 
on political participation. As hypothesized, individuals who belong to an ethnic minority 
group are less likely to participate in national elections when neither power-sharing nor 
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power-dividing institutions are present. In line with our expectations, three of the six 
institutions seem to have a moderating impact on the probability of voting – indicated by the 
positive sign of the interaction terms. However, the information provided in Table 3 does not 
suffice for a satisfactory interpretation of the interaction terms and the hypotheses (Brambor 
et al. 2006). To evaluate the proposed attenuating effect more closely we present the marginal 
effects of belonging to an ethnic minority in Figure 1 and Table 4. Five out of the six 
interactions were significant28, but only one of the institutions showed the expected 
attenuating effect. Figure 1 illustrates that suffrage rights have a positive impact on ethnic 
minorities’ propensity to vote until a threshold of .82 is reached. Above this threshold, 
increased suffrage has no longer a significant effect. In other words, the less people are 
excluded from voting, the higher is the electoral participation of ethnic minorities. 
 
The remaining four institutions which show a significant interactive impact are subnational 
authority, subnational elections, the number of parties in government and disproportionality. 
Contrary to our expectation, the effects are all negative. The graphs for the number of 
governmental parties and the disproportionality of the electoral system reveal, however, that 
the effects are far from substantial – indicated through the extremely flat curve. Likewise, the 
negative effect for the possibility of subnational elections is very small and reduces the 
probability to vote for individuals belonging to ethnic minorities by only 2 per cent.  
By contrast, the effect of subnational authority is strong and, contrary to our expectations, 
negative. This means that the already low propensity of national electoral participation among 
individuals belonging to an ethnic minority group is even lower in decentralized countries 
(i.e., countries where the subnational units have high authority over taxing, spending, and 
legislating). Individuals belonging to an ethnic minority group (with all control variables set 
to their mean or mode, respectively) had a predicted probability of 0.81 of going to the polls. 
This probability decreased to 0.73 in countries with high subnational authority. This indicator 
also lowered – to a lesser degree – the participation propensity of majorities from 0.85 to 0.80.  
 
                                                 
28
 With regard to Figure 1, one can see whether an effect is significant by considering the 90% confidence inter-
vals around the line – it is statistically significant whenever the upper and lower bounds of the confidence inter-
val are both above (or below) zero. For the results in Table 4 an effect is significant if the values at 0 and at 1 are 
both significant. 
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Figure 1: Marginal Effect of Belonging to an Ethnic Minority on political Participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Marginal Effect of Belonging to an Ethnic Minority on political participation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Computation of predicted probabilities is based on the adjust-command in Stata 
11. All control variables are held constant at their mean (continuous variables) or mode 
(dummy variables). We report unstandardized coefficients with standard errors in 
brackets. 
 
Therefore, whereas widespread suffrage has an inclusive effect on ethnic minorities, 
federalism – at least in terms of subnational authority – has clearly an exclusive effect.29 
These results can be interpreted based upon the critics discussed above, which argue that 
subnational authority only increases the incentives to influence politics at the subnational 
                                                 
29
 We also tested other vertical institutions - e.g bicameralism - to see whether this negative effect is limited to 
"subnational authority". However, the effect was not significant and, therefore, not interpretable. 
Variables 
 
Values of 
Institutions 
Coefficients 
(standard 
errors in 
brackets 
Predicted Prob-
abilities 
Subnational Elections 0 1.22 (.31)** 
.77  
 1 1.11 (.28)** 
.75  
Subnational Authority 0 1.42 (.18)** .81 
 1 1.02 (.25)** .73 
Proportional Representation 0 0.53 (.40)**        .63 
 1 0.98 (.37)** .72 
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Graphs are based on results from models 1, 3 and 
4  in Table 3. Marginal effects are calculated for 
changes of individual-level variables from 0 to 1, 
holding all other independent variables at their 
mean (continuous variables) or at their mode 
(dummy variables). Computation is based on a 
modification of the Stata code provided by 
Brambor et al. (2006). Dashed lines represent 
95% confidence intervals; the vertical line indi-
cates the threshold below/above which the re-
spective variables have no longer a significant 
effect. 
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level. Hence, when politics is important at the subnational level, it is more rational for 
individuals to participate there. At the same time, according to the hypothesis of voter fatigue 
(Rallings et al., 2003), subnational authority lowers the propensity to participate at the 
national level. However, two things are worth noting. First, given our data, we could not test 
this ad-hoc explanation. We should test this assumption with the propensity to vote at 
subnational elections. Second, the fact that the negative interactive effect of subnational 
authority was stronger for ethnic minorities than for ethnic majorities should give us pause for 
reflection. This could be interpreted as a sign of an exclusive effect of federalism in 
comparison to horizontal power-sharing institutions. However, the findings included in Table 
3 weaken these interpretations since disproportionality, the number of government parties, 
and subnational elections do not have a substantial interactive effect on political participation.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this paper was to test whether individuals belonging to ethnic minority groups 
have a lower propensity to vote and whether there are institutions which attenuate this 
negative effect. We argued that it is irrational for minorities to go to the polls when they have 
no chance to influence the voting decisions. However, at the same time, this behavior is 
undemocratic and deleterious for national cohesion: It is argued that neither the normative 
democratic ideals of equality and responsiveness nor the empirical necessity of stability due to 
confidence in the political system is upheld when minority groups exclude themselves from 
politics. However, we know at least since the work of Lijphart (1977, 1999) that there are 
institutional remedies for minority inclusion. Widespread suffrage as well as vertical and 
horizontal power-sharing institutions are suggested to include minorities because they give 
them a possibility to have a say. In rational choice logic, these institutions increase the benefit 
of voting for minorities and, consequently, motivate them to participate in elections.  
 
We investigated the utility of these suggestions with several multi-level analyses that modeled 
the interactive impact of the institutions on the effect of belonging to an ethnic minority group 
on voting propensity. The results generally indicated a negative relationship of ethnic 
minority membership on the probability of voting. However, two of the six measures for 
inclusive institutions had a significant and substantive moderating effect. Specifically, 
widespread suffrage attenuated the negative effect, whereas subnational authority over taxing, 
spending, and legislating intensified it.  
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These results can be discussed in light of growing heterogeneization of democratic societies. 
In fact, most Western democracies face growing migration which challenges national 
cohesion and sparks debates about inclusion and exclusion on the political agenda. Of course, 
one solution might be to close the borders by adopting restrictive immigration policies. 
Supported by right-wing parties that benefit from the fear of heterogeneity, governments 
justify such policies by arguing that more ethnic diversity puts the national identity in danger. 
However, most countries already have a relatively high number of ethnic minorities, including 
immigrants (e.g., people of Turkish descent in Germany and people of former colonies in the 
United Kingdom) and indigenous peoples (e.g., the Maori in New Zealand). Closing the 
borders will not solve the problem. On the contrary, it might increase the danger of growing 
mistrust and political instability or even negatively affect the inclusion of minority groups. 
 
Contrary to the exclusion solution, our first finding proposes that the extension of political 
rights, such as suffrage rights, can foster the inclusion of ethnic minorities in the electoral 
process. As mentioned above, we analyzed only ethnic minorities who already have the right 
to vote. Nevertheless, the motivation to go to the polls is higher for ethnic minorities when 
suffrage is widespread. We argue that this can be interpreted as a sign of an inclusive culture. 
The more individuals are given the right to have a say, the more inclusive is the political 
culture and, consequently, the higher is the motivation for electoral participation.  
 
The second finding seems to challenge the initial idea of Lijphart (1999). Horizontal power 
sharing is not inclusive in terms of mobilizing ethnic minorities. On the contrary, when 
subnational regions are given high autonomy, the inclusion of ethnic minorities through the 
electoral channel is limited. In fact, the propensity of an individual who belongs to an ethnic 
minority group to go to the polls is even lower in federalist than in unitarian countries. 
However, we should interpret this result cautiously because it might have two causes. First, 
this finding can be interpreted as “voter fatigue” (Rallings et al., 2003). In federal states, 
citizens must vote not only for national, but also for subnational public authorities. Second, 
low participation propensity for national elections in countries with autonomous subnational 
regions might be compensated by higher participation at the subnational level. Results of 
electoral research in Switzerland (Ladner & Bühlmann, 2006) show that individual interest in 
national politics and individual participation in national elections can be partly explained by 
language region. In other words, minority groups are less interested in national politics and 
show a lower propensity to go to the polls than their compatriots. However, compared to the 
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majority group, they have more interest in local politics. In one of our models, we tested for 
the impact of subnational elections. The direct effect of this variable was negative, but not 
significant, and there was no substantial interactive effect. Thus, the first interpretation seems 
to have more support in this study than the second: vertical power dividing has an exclusive 
impact on ethnic minorities concerning their participation at the national level 
 
However, this finding is somewhat puzzling. On the one hand, shifting power to subnational 
entities can increase the power of minorities. Results of additional research conducted by the 
authors not presented here (Bühlmann & Hänni, 2010) show that ethnic minorities have less 
diffuse political support but that this is attenuated by vertical power dividing. Thus, providing 
ethnic minorities with the possibility of living autonomously in their own culture in 
subnational entities strengthens national cohesion in terms of diffuse support. On the other 
hand, our results presented here showed that power shifting seems to occur at the cost of 
inclusion at the national level, at least in terms of national elections or – so to speak – specific 
support. However, it is unclear whether we can speak of inclusion when ethnic minorities are 
less motivated to co-decide on national political representation because they have better 
opportunities at the subnational level.  
 
Our results cannot yet provide to solve this puzzle. Additional refined research on this topic is 
necessary. First, the data we used can only offer a vague insight into the complexity of ethnic 
heterogeneity. The self-evaluation of a respondent regarding whether he or she belongs to an 
ethnic minority group can only yield superficial insights. We do not know to which ethnic 
group the respondents belong and, therefore, cannot control for important characteristics of 
these groups, such as size, regional concentration, or political power. Second, in order to 
really test whether the negative interactive impact of federalism is a sign of too many 
elections or a sign of a trade-off between subnational inclusion and national exclusion, we 
should investigate participation behavior at different federal levels.   
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